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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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modern armament, without artillery, tanks or planes, should go into
action against an enemy, then at the height of his success.5*
The Russians, with their usual ruthlessness, did not consider this side
of the problem, they only wanted an immediate revolt in the rear of the
German Army. An appeal of this kind sounded more than extraordinary
to the Polish people who had already been fighting for two years. It
seemed incomprehensible to hear the Soviets summoning them to revolt.
The moral position of Russia after her action during the past two years in
Poland's Eastern provinces, could not under such circumstances be
strong . . . therefore, Moscow dared not venture to speak directly to the
Poles in German-occupied Poland during the first months of her sojourn
in the Allied camp. Russian wave lengths broadcast under the name of
the Polish Underground, although the Soviet authorities categorically
denied that these were their stations. " Polish patriots," the Soviet radio
station e Front * appealed on January I3th, 1942, for instance, " should
come into close contact with the Red Army. Try to visualise the effect of
your revolt now on the enemy! Imagine what would happen if all Poles
began a merciless attack on the Germans ! " It was difficult to visualise
in any case, how the Polish patriots could come into close contact with the
Red Army when it was in retreat to the Volga. It was easy, however,
to understand what the effect of such revolt would have been for the Polish
people. As things then stood the German High Command would, in
fact, have been extremely satisfied to watch any such move on the part of
the Underground, for it meant nothing less than the ultimate capture and
elimination of highly dangerous opponents.
Neither the Polish nation nor, for that matter, any other oppressed
nation in Europe, awaited a call from Moscow to begin their fight against
Germany. At that stage of the war none of them would have agreed that
such a call corresponded with their national interests. And, circumstances
more astonishing still, even as the Russian radio stations were broadcasting
these inciting speeches, thousands of Polish soldiers were still held im-
prisoned in Soviet dungeons.
There was another side to this question of an uprising in Poland, namely,
that the Russians, .during their occupation of her Eastern provinces, had
* Wojtkiewicz Strumphs S.a Wojsko Polskie w Sowietach (" Polish Forces in the
Soviet Union ")> Bellona, London, June, 1944, p. 32:
The Russians even more ardently than they were endeavouring to have a Polish
division on the front, were striving to organise an uprising in the rear of the Ger-
mans. Immediately after the first talks with the Chief of General Staff* Marshal
Shaposhnikov and General Panfilov, the Chief of the Polish Military Mission,
General Szyszko Bohusz, reported to Premier Sikorski from Moscow, that the
Soviets had put forward the question of an action within Poland itself, as the first
plan. I was in Moscow in the early days of September, 19413 and I observed
with the greatest amazement that the Soviets were recruiting our people for this
action, and the pressure on General Anders regarding this objective was very
strong. The fact that any rising in Poland hi 1941, would have been hopeless and
would have been <paid for with a sea of Polish blood . , . was of no concern to the
Russians . . . They were following their own interests in this matter,